NOC:Games and Information

Lecture 1 - Introduction, why do delays happen, contention for resources

Lecture 2 - Performance metrics and parameters

Lecture 3 - Introducing Queuing Systems

Lecture 4 - Memoryless Distributions

Lecture 5 - Operational Laws

Lecture 6 - Aumann model of incomplete information: Definition and Examples

Lecture 7 - Knowledge operator: Definition and Examples

Lecture 8 - Common knowledge: Definition and Examples

Lecture 9 - The structural theorem of common knowledge

Lecture 10 - Proof of the structural theorem (forward direction)

Lecture 11 - Proof of the structural theorem (backward direction)

Lecture 12 - Aumann model of incomplete information with belief: Definition and Examples

Lecture 13 - Aumann's agreement theorem

Lecture 14 - Zero-sum game definition and Security strategies

Lecture 15 - Saddle point strategies

Lecture 16 - Further properties of saddle point strategies

Lecture 17 - Mixed strategies

Lecture 18 - Weirstrass lemma and existence of a mixed saddle point strategy

Lecture 19 - Von Nuenmann minmax theorem

Lecture 20 - Computing mixed saddle point startegy: Holmes and Moriarty

Lecture 21 - Computing mixed strategy saddle point: 2X2 matrix game

Lecture 22 - Computing mixed strategy saddle point: 2X3 matrix game

Lecture 23 - Nash equilibrium of a non zero-sum game and its relation with Kakutani fixed

Lecture 24 - Proof: Existence of Nash equilibrium (Condition 1 of Kakutani fixed point)

Lecture 25 - Proof: Existence of Nash equilibrium (Condition 2 of Kakutani fixed point)

Lecture 26 - Existence of Nash equilibrium for infinite strategy space (Using Brower's)

Lecture 27 - Quantal Response: Motivation

Lecture 28 - Quantal Response: Formal model

Lecture 29 - Dynamic games definiton

Lecture 30 - Solution concept in dynamic games

Lecture 31 - Relation of the heuristic solution with the Nash equilibrium of the standard

Lecture 32 - Example of a Threat equilibrium

Lecture 33 - Interpreting the threat equilibrium in standard normal form of the dynamic game

Lecture 34 - Extensive form games - I

Lecture 35 - Extensive form games - II

Lecture 36 - Single Act Games

Lecture 37 - Informationally inferior games

Lecture 38 - Information Structure in Single Act Games

Lecture 39 - Nested and Ladder Nested Extensive form games

Lecture 40 - Equilibrium Algorithm

Lecture 41 - Stage-wise multi act games

Lecture 42 - Feedback equilibrium

Lecture 43 - Mixed and Behavioral Strategies

Lecture 44 - Conditions for equivalence for mixed and behavioral strategies

Lecture 45 - Kuhn's Theorem - I

Lecture 46 - Kuhn's Theorem - II

Lecture 47 - Kuhn's Theorem - III

Lecture 48 - Games of incomplete information

Lecture 49 - Bayesian Nash equilibrium - I

Lecture 50 - Bayesian Nash equilibrium - II

Lecture 51 - Self-enforcement of Nash equilibrium

Lecture 52 - Stackelberg game

Lecture 53 - Principal-Agent Models - I

Lecture 54 - Principal-Agent Models - II

Lecture 55 - Moral Hazard and Adverse selection

Lecture 56 - Games with contracts

Lecture 57 - Correlated Equilibrium - I

Lecture 58 - Correlated Equilibrium - II

Lecture 59 - Correlated Equilibrium - III

Lecture 60 - Bayesian Game with mediated communication

Lecture 61 - Revelation Principle